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Fiber-based quantum key distribution (QKD) networks are limited without quan-
tum repeaters. Satellite-based QKD links have been proposed to extend the network
domain. We developed a quantum communication system, suitable for a realistic
space-to-ground link, and executed an entanglement-based QKD protocol, achiev-
ing quantum bit error rates (QBER) below 2%. More importantly, we demonstrate
low QBER execution of a higher dimensional QKD protocol. Using a finite-key se-
curity analysis and Doppler-shift compensation, we show it is better suited for a
space-to-ground link.
MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
Implementing quantum key distribution (QKD) or other quantum communication pro-
tocols over long distances is a major goal and challenge for establishing a global quantum
network. To lay dedicated dark fiber over long distances is expensive and non-reconfigurable,
and, without quantum repeaters, such links have very low transmission. The low transmis-
sion is due the exponential scaling of absorption in fiber with distance. It has been proposed
to instead use space-based links where there are quantum channels between a ground station
and an orbiting platform [1, 2]. Such a channel has much lower loss than fiber over the same
distance, allowing much more efficient protocol execution over comparable distances; for
example, the recent achievement of entanglement distribution from a satellite to two ground
stations realized a loss reduction of some 12 orders of magnitude [3], though the detection
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2rate and signal-to-noise ratio were far too low for secure entanglement-based QKD. Also, the
same satellite demonstrated decoy-state QKD, realizing a 20 orders of magnitude enhance-
ment in channel transmission [4, 5]. A number of other groups around the world are also
working on similar endeavors [6–9]. To this same end, we have developed a single system
to implement multiple quantum communication protocols relevant for satellite-based quan-
tum communication. We have characterized the performance of this system to implement
superdense teleportation[10]. Here we investigate polarization entanglement-based QKD
(specifically, the BBM92 protocol [11]) as well as a higher dimensional, hyperentanglement-
based QKD (HEQKD) protocol, including a finite-key security analysis implemented in the
same system as superdense teleportation. See S.M. for BBM92 protocol, results, finite-key
analysis and discussion.
We consider an entanglement-based (d = 4) QKD protocol with four measurement bases.
Alice and Bob share the initial state
|ΨAB〉 = 1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉+ |33〉). (1)
Alice’ and Bob’s bases are written as {Ak}4k=1 and {Bk}4k=1, respectively, and we suppose
that their reference frames and measurements are aligned, i.e., Ak = Bk for k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Assuming Alice and Bob are each operating in a four-dimensional Hilbert space with com-
putational basis given by Z = {|i〉}4i=1, their measurement bases are defined as A1 ≡ Z,
A2 ≡ {(|1〉 ± |2〉)/
√
2, (|3〉 ± |4〉)/√2}, A3 ≡ {(|1〉 ± |3〉)/
√
2, (|2〉 ± |4〉)/√2}, and A4 ≡
{(|1〉+|2〉+|3〉−|4〉)/2, (|1〉+|2〉−|3〉+|4〉)/2, (|1〉−|2〉+|3〉+|4〉)/2, (|1〉−|2〉−|3〉−|4〉)/2},
and similarly for Bob. It can be easily checked that bases 1 and 4 and bases 2 and 3 are
mutually unbiased. Bases 1 and 2 are each chosen with probability p, while bases 3 and 4
are each chosen with probability q. Hence, we have that 2p+ 2q = 1, or q = 1/2− p. When
a measurement is made, Alice/Bob either observes a valid symbol or an outcome which is
inconclusive. An example of the latter would be an empty detection event or a multiple
detection event. Here, to overcome the problem of detection-loophole we assume that all
successful detection events are independent of Alice/Bob’s basis choices, and to overcome the
issue of multiple detections, we simply assign a random symbol if a multiple detection event
is observed. These conditions allow us to restrict the security analysis to post-selected joint
states, which are the shared quantum states conditioned on both Alice and Bob receiving a
valid symbol.
3TABLE I: HEQKD Bases:All basis combinations in the HEQKD protocol and their effect
on key generation. MUB = mutually-unbaised basis, and Bits/Photon, in this case, means
bits of raw key per sifted coincident photon pair detected.
After the measurement phase, Alice and Bob perform sifting (via public communication)
to identify successful events according to their basis choices. We denote these sets by Sk,k′
and their respective lengths by mk,k′ . For example, the data belonging to set S1,3 are the
events in which Alice and Bob chose basis 1 and 3, respectively, and each detected one
photon (though the results are not necessarily correct).
In our protocol, we extract secret keys from Alice’s measurement data. We partition
her data into four sets, namely, sets containing events in which Alice chooses either basis
1 or basis 2 (which data comprises the raw key) and sets containing events in which Alice
chooses either basis 3 or basis 4 (used to determine Alices’ QBER). Alice’ data in basis 1
will be paired with Bob’s data from basis 1, 2 and 3, and data in basis 2 will be paired with
Bob’s data from basis 1, 2 and 4. Note that common bases should ideally generate perfectly
4correlated data (2 bits per measurement) while bases that are not mutually unbiased and
common should ideally generate partially correlated data (1 bit per measurement). S3,3 and
S4,4 are used for error estimation. S3,4 and S4,3 are unused. See Table I for the complete list
of pairings.
We acknowledge there are others working on higher dimensional quantum key distribution[12–
16]. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has used hyperentanglement and been
able to make the full set of measurements required to implement a higher dimensional
quantum key distribution protocol with that hyperentangled state.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
HEQKD like BBM92 requires the generation and distribution of entangled photons. As
shown in Fig. 1, we prepare non-degenerate entangled photons at 1550 nm and 810 nm (see
S.M. for more information) that are entangled in their polarization and time-bin degrees of
freedom:
|ΨAB〉 = 1
2
(|(Ht1)810(Ht1)1550〉+ |(V t2)810(V t2)1550〉+
|(V t1)810(V t1)1550〉+ |(Ht2)810(Ht2)1550〉), (2)
where |0〉 ≡ |Ht1〉, |1〉 ≡ |V t2〉, |2〉 ≡ |V t1〉, and |3〉 ≡ |Ht2〉 for H, V , t1, and t2 representing
horizontal polarization, vertical polarization, time bin one, and time bin two, respectively.
The measurements of the four bases are made using an analyzer interferometer, polarization
optics, and a time-bin sorting circuit. The analyzer interferometer allows for measurements
of superpositions of the time bins, while the polarization optics allow for measurements of
different combinations of polarization and time bin. Measurements in bases 1 and 2 (or 3
and 4) are distinguished by the time-bin sorting circuit that is electrically in between the
detectors and the time taggers; see S.M. for explanation of the necessity and operation of
the time-bin sorting circuit. See S.M. Table I for a complete description of the mapping
between the bases and measurements to the output time bins and detectors.
For our HEQKD, the probability of basis 1 and basis 2 is split evenly, as is the probability
between basis 3 and basis 4, because of the 50/50 non-polarizing beamsplitters in Alice’s
and Bob’s analyzers. However, the choice of measuring basis 1 or 2 vs basis 3 or 4 can
be controlled by rotating a HWP at the front of the analyzer interferometer. For this
5FIG. 1: BBM92 and HEQKD Optical Setup: Photonic ququarts entangled in polarization
and time-bin are generated via spontaneous parametric downconversion in
periodically-poled lithium niobate (See S.M.). Green lines are the 532-nm pump (and
stabilization) beam; red and yellow are the signal (810 nm) and idler (1550 nm) photons,
respectively. For BBM92, the pump right-angle prism was blocked so there was no
time-bin entanglement. In the analyzer the short arm measured photons in the H/V basis
and the long arm measured photons in the D/A basis; see S.M. for more information. For
HEQKD, both time-bin and polarization entanglement are used; see S.M. Table I and S.M.
Table II for the measurement-to-detector mapping. The phase in the phase-sensitive bases
(bases 2, 3, and 4) is tuned by tilting the quarter waveplate before the Sagnac
interferometer and/or actuating the liquid crystals after Alice’s analyzer interferometer.
All half waveplates just before the detectors were set at 22.5◦ from horizontal. The half
waveplate before the analyzer interferometer was set at 0 (22.5◦) from horizontal for
measurements in bases 1,2 (3,4).
experiment, we chose to measure in basis 1 and basis 2 2p = 50% of the time. Later
in our analysis, we calculate the optimum value for this parameter in a space-to-ground
channel. Not randomly choosing the basis for every send attempt, i.e., every pump pulse,
6can lead to a vulnerability to photon-number-splitting attacks[17], e.g., in decoy-state QKD.
However, entangled photons from SDPC are not susceptible to such attacks, because there
is no correlation between photons of different pairs[18]. Since only detected pairs of photons
make it into the raw key, we would only have to rotate the HWP at the average detected
single-photon rate on the ground. At the rates we expect, this could be easily done by an
electro-optic modulator.
RESULTS
The intrinsic QBER of the system can be measured accurately for all bases when the
probability of producing an entangled pair is low, so that the probability of producing
multiple pairs (which can cause errors) is negligible. But since this also reduces the key
rate, there is a trade-off, leading to an optimum pump power (pair production probability)
that produces the most secret key per run, accounting for finite statistics. Fig. 2a shows
the measured QBER vs pair production probability, Pp ∼ SASBRCAB , where Si is the singles
rates for Alice or Bob, R is the repetition rate of the laser, and CAB is the total coincidence
rate between Alice and Bob. See S.M. Fig 6-7 for a complete measured “crosstalk matrix”
between Alice and Bob under normal operation, and when there is a simulated “intercept-
resend attack” from Eve.
Since there would be a finite time window during orbit when we could establish the
required line-of-sight quantum channel (see link analysis below), it was important to charac-
terize the system for various values of channel transmission. Also, errors from detector noise
and background events would start to dominate when the channel transmission becomes
too low. Fig. 2b shows the measured QBER for each basis at decreasing values of channel
transmission. At the highest measured transmission in Fig. 2b, our system (which was not
optimized for key rate but QBER) produced ∼2k sifted events/s. During those measure-
ments, Alice’s channel transmission was fixed at -15 dB, the pair production probability was
Pp = 0.015, and the laser repetition rate was 80 MHz.
By calculation, we found the optimum pair production probabilities, Pp, and basis choice
probability, p, for our application to be about 0.12 and 0.2, respectively, as shown in Fig.
3a. In a direct comparison between HEQKD and BBM92, using a finite key analysis, we
found that HEQKD allows for secure key generation at higher losses than does BBM92, and
7FIG. 2: QBER Characterization: Measurement of QBER for each key-generating HEQKD
basis combination. (a) QBER measured as a function of pair production probability
(adjusted by varying the pump laser power). The channel transmission for Alice and Bob
are -15 dB and -18 dB, respectively. (b) QBER versus the transmission of the channel
between the entangled photon source and Bob. During these measurements, Alice’s channel
transmission was fixed at -15 dB and the pair production probability was Pp = 0.015.
for higher key rates than BBM92 when the losses are less extreme. This comparison was
done with all system parameters being equal except choosing the optimum pair production
probability of 0.12 for HEQKD and 0.04 for BBM92. See Table II for all system parameters
used in the simulations. For use in the simulation, we also created QBER(Pp) for each basis
combination using lines of best fit from the data in Fig. 2a. Fig. 3b, we calculated the secure
key fraction for BBM92 and HEQKD; this is the fraction of bits from the raw key that make
it in the secure key. Note, there is a larger than 10-dB span where only HEQKD provides a
non-zero secure key fraction. This is primarily due to the increased error tolerance of higher
dimensional protocols[19] in general, which allows for a higher pair production probability
to be used.
8(a) (b)
FIG. 3: Finite Key Simulations: (a) Calculated HEQKD secure key length vs Bob’s
channel loss for various pair production probabilities Pp and basis choice probability p,
calculated using feasible future system parameters: 400-MHz laser repetition rate, 180-s
orbital pass time, 10−6 background noise, and Alice’s total transmission = 0.3, including
detection efficiency. See Table II for more details. (b) Calculated secure key fraction
comparison between HEQKD and BBM92, choosing the optimum pair production
probability of 0.12 for HEQKD and 0.04 for BBM92, with all other system parameters
being equal. A likely range of channel loss ranges between 25 and 35 dB as indicated by
the dashed lines.
Link Analysis
The elevation-angle of the ISS with respect to some terrestrial observatory (say with a
latitude of 39◦ N) changes as it passes overhead and has a maximum elevation angle that
varies from pass to pass. With that in mind, displayed in Fig. 4, we show the predicted secure
key length for HEQKD and BBM92, versus maximum elevation angle per pass, assuming
the minimum acceptable elevation angle during a pass is 20◦ (below this we assume a reliable
link cannot be established).
For these calculations, we used simulated orbit data for all orbital parameters. The simu-
9FIG. 4: Finite Key Link Analysis: Simulated secure key length per orbital pass for
HEQKD and BBM92 vs the maximum elevation angle per orbital pass. The channel loss
varied between 28 dB and 36 dB in this simulation. The pass time increases with the
maximum elevation angle so higher elevation angle passes had more time to generate raw
key. Simulations using feasible future system parameters: 400-MHz laser repetition rate,
180-s orbital pass time, 10−6 background noise, and Alice’s total transmission = 0.3,
including detection efficiency. See Table II and Link analysis section for more details.
lation of the ISS orbit used a 400-km altitude and 51◦ inclination. The range was calculated
from the ISS to a ground station located at 39◦ N latitude. We used the Friis equation to es-
timate channel transmission (η) as a function of range (r) η(r) = (piDTDR/(4λr))
2 [20, 21],
discretely integrated over the whole pass (for transmitting telescope diameter DT = 0.1 m,
receiving telescope diameter DR = 1 m, and wavelength λ = 1550 nm, with the added
assumptions of a 6-dB loss for receiver telescope and adaptive optics efficiency and 4-dB loss
from the analysis/detection system, and used the assumed system parameters in Table II.
Therefore, with those assumptions, a future implementation of this system in space should
generate a secure key of substantial length in a single pass where, for most passes, BBM92
would not generate a secure key at all under the same operating conditions. This is because
the maximum elevation angle and pass frequency are inversely proportional (passes with
lower max elevation angle are more frequent).
Finally, since any transmitter in space will be moving rapidly, the interval between adja-
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TABLE II: System Parameters: Current and expected future system parameters relevant
to simulation.
cent time bins in the ground station’s reference frame initially will be reduced with respect
to time-bin interval measured in the transmitter’s reference frame, as the transmitter is
approaching. The intervals will match as the transmitter passes overhead, and as it moves
away, the received interval will be longer. S.M. Fig. 15b shows a pictorial representation of
this phenomena. Because the International Space Station (ISS), travels at about 7.7 km/s,
the change in path length between two time bins separated by ∼ 1 ns is about 20 µm for
a pass directly overhead, which is over 80 radians for a wavelength of 1550 nm. To keep
this Doppler shift (and any other time-varying phase shifts) from adversely affecting the
protocol’s performance, we developed a phase stabilization system that uses a classical laser
beam and proportional-integral feedback to track the path-length difference of the ground
interferometer so it matches that of the emitted time bins throughout the pass (see S.M. for
more information). With phase stabilization off, QKD is not possible because the QBER in
some bases is too high, as seen in Fig. 5a; even though other bases are unaffected by the
Doppler shift since their basis states, e.g., polarization, are time-bin phase insensitive. Fig.
5b shows the performance of HEQKD while a lab-simulated Doppler shift was occurring,
with the phase stabilization activated. During the Doppler shift the QBER was held stable
to < 1% standard deviation.
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FIG. 5: Doppler Shift Effect on HEQKD: Measured QBER for all basis combinations
during an in-lab simulated Doppler shift. (a) without phase stabilization. (b) with phase
stabilization active.
DISCUSSION
In Fig. 2a, we see significant variation in the intrinsic QBER of each basis, originating
from the different physical processes that are present in the states and projections measured
in each basis. QBER in basis 1 is only affected by imperfect H/V basis alignment between
Alice and Bob and imperfect polarizing beamsplitter extinction ratio, leading to only ∼ 1%
QBER (|HV 〉-type terms in our state generation could also cause this same QBER, but are
apparently negligible, since the basis 1 QBER matches our classical measurements of the
basis alignment and polarizing beamsplitter). Basis 2 is affected by the same influences as
basis 1, but is also affected by the temporal entanglement visibility (∼ 96% → 2% QBER)
and imbalances in the measured amplitudes of the terms in the superposition (∼ 0.5%
QBER). Basis 3 is also affected by the same error processes as basis 1, and is also affected
by imperfect polarization entanglement purity of the source (D/A visibility ∼ 98% → 1%
QBER) and imbalances in the measured amplitudes of the terms in the superposition (∼
0.5% QBER). Finally, basis 4 is affected by all previously mentioned error processes, and
thus has the highest total QBER.
From these measurements and analyses, we find this system suitable for operation in the
channel between space and earth. Furthermore, we find that the use of time-bin qubits in
12
general should be feasible for a channel that includes an orbiting platform, assuming one
compensates for the adverse effect from the Doppler shift, as we have done. To successfully
execute this protocol in a space-to-earth channel, active polarization compensation (to cor-
rect for rotations produced by the sending and receiving optics) and phase stabilization (to
phase stabilize the time bins from the Doppler shift and from other variations, e.g., satellite
vibrations or laboratory temperature fluctuations) must be implemented in real time. Addi-
tionally, after the previous compensation systems have been activated, but prior to protocol
execution, a phase calibration step is necessary for bases which include superpositions of
time bins, so that Alice and Bob are indeed measuring in the same bases. Implementing
such systems is readily achievable with current technology.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
HEQKD and BBM92 Finite Key Analysis
Preliminaries: models
In the following, we will analyze the finite-key security of entanglement-based BB84
(also called BBM92) and a high-dimensional QKD protocol using two sets of two mutually
unbiased bases. The security proof technique that we will be using is the entropic uncertainty
relation, which is based on Ref. [22].
In both of the above protocols, we assume that entanglement is generated in Alice’s labo-
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ratory using a practical light source, namely via a spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC) source, where a non-linear crystal is used to split a strong laser beam into pairs
of correlated photons. Quantum mechanically, we can write the output state (using vector
representation) of such a source as
|Ψ〉AB ≡ cosh−2(χ)
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 1 tanhn(χ)|ψn〉AB, (3)
where
|ψn〉AB ≡
1
n+ 1
n∑
k=0
(−1)k|n− k, k〉A ⊗ |k, n− k〉B. (4)
Accordingly, the probability to get an n−photon pair is
Pn ≡ (n+ 1)γ
n
(1 + γ)n+2
, (5)
where γ ≡ sinh2(χ) is related to the pump power of the laser, and P1=Pp, the pair production
probability, mentioned elsewhere in this work.
For our purpose we only need to know the photon number distribution of the SPDC
source. Unlike the prepare-and-measure scenario, multi-photon pairs in the entanglement-
based scenario are robust against basis-dependent and loss-dependent attacks (e.g., photon-
number-splitting attacks), due to the fact that each pair in a multi-pair pulse is independent,
and Alice’s and Bob’s measurements act independently on each received photon.
To model the detection rates (which are needed for the simulation), we define ηA and ηB
to be the overall detection efficiencies for Alice and Bob, respectively. Note that ηA and ηB
include all the losses due to the quantum channel, coupling loss, and detection inefficiency.
Using this definition, it is easy to see that the probability of observing a coincident detection
(i.e., at least a click on each side) given the emission of an n−photon pair, |ψn〉, is
ηn = [1− (1− ηA)n][1− (1− ηB)n]. (6)
In addition, we define the yield of an n−photon pair to be Yn, which is the conditional
probability that a coincident detection is observed given the source emits an n−photon pair.
We may further model the n−photon yield as
Yn = [1− (1− ξA)(1− ηA)n][1− (1− ξB)(1− ηB)n], (7)
where ξA (ξB) is the probability of observing a dark detection on Alice’s (Bob’s) side. There-
fore, in the case of zero photon emission, we have
Y0 = ξAξB. (8)
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Using the above models, the overall detection rate for a given γ is
Rγ =
∞∑
n=0
PnYn = 1− 1− ξA
(1 + ηAγ)2
− 1− ξB
(1 + ηBγ)2
+
(1− ξA)(1− ξB)
(1 + ηAγ + ηBγ − ηAηBγ)2 . (9)
The overall (expected) quantum bit error rate (QBER) is given as
Q2Dγ Rγ = Vγ =
Rγ
2
− 2(1/2− δ)ηAηBγ(1 + γ)
(1 + ηAγ)(1 + ηBγ)(1 + ηAγ + ηBγ − ηAηBγ) and (10)
Q4Dγ Rγ = Vγ =
3Rγ
4
− 2(3/4− δ)ηAηBγ(1 + γ)
(1 + ηAγ)(1 + ηBγ)(1 + ηAγ + ηBγ − ηAηBγ) , (11)
where δ is the intrinsic QBER of the quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob. Here Q2Dγ
(Q4Dγ ) is the QBER for BBM92 (HEQKD).
Security Bound for BBM92
Having defined the quantum channel and source models, we are now ready to derive a
bound on the extractable key length (denoted by `) for a given post-processing block size
(the number of raw bits we collect in one execution of the protocol).
To further model the security of the QKD protocol, we consider a (d = 2) QKD protocol
with two mutually unbiased bases. The bases are uniformly chosen (with 1/2 probability
each) and the raw key is generated from both bases. That is, the raw key is randomly
sampled from the measurement data (of size N); thus the size of the raw key is fixed to
some positive integer n. Following standard security definitions [23], we say that the QKD
protocol is ε-secure if it is both εsec-secret and εcor-correct. For the first condition, the
protocol is called εsec-secret if the joint state of the output secret key (say on Alice side) and
the adversary’s total quantum information is statistically indistinguishable from the ideal
output state except with some small probability εsec. The ideal output state is an output key
which is uniformly random (in the key space) and completely independent of the adversary’s
total information. For the second condition, the protocol is called εcor-correct if the output
secret keys on Alice and Bob’s sides are identical except with some small probability εcor.
The starting point of our security analysis is to ask how many secret bits can be extracted
from Alice’ raw key X (of size n) given E (Eve’ total information about the QKD system).
To this end, we use the quantum leftover-hash lemma [24] to bound the secret key length,
`, giving
` = max
β∈(0,εsec/2]
⌊
H
εsec/2−β
min (X|E) + 4 log2 β − 2
⌋
, (12)
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where the left-hand term in the floor function is the smooth min-entropy of X given E (see
Ref. [25] for more details).
Using the fact that there exists a squashing model for two mutually unbiased measure-
ments (it applies regardless of whether the implementation is active or passive basis choice),
we can bound the min-entropy using the entropic uncertainty relation [22], assuming the
measurements on Alice’s side are mutually unbiased (e.g., no polarization misalignment at
the measurement level). More specifically, we have
H
εsec/2−β
min (X|E) ≥ n(1− h2(Q2Dobs + ∆))− Synd2DEC − log2
2
εcor
and (13)
Synd2DEC = 1.12nh2(Q
2D
obs), (14)
where
∆ ≡
√
n+ k
nk
k + 1
k
log
1
β
, (15)
and Synd2DEC and log2 2/εcor are the leakages due to error correction and verification, respec-
tively. Putting everything together, we get
`2D = max
β∈(0,εsec/4)
⌊
n(1− h2(Q2Dobs + ∆))− Synd2DEC − log2
8
β4εcor
⌋
. (16)
Security Bound for HEQKD
To compute the finite-key security of Alice’ data, we first need to introduce some random
variables to capture the random behavior of the measurements. To that end, let X1 be the
random string of length n1 = m1,1 + m1,2 + m1,3 describing Alice’ measurement outcomes
when she chooses basis 1. Likewise, for the case when Alice chooses basis 2 we write X2
to denote the random string of n2 = m2,1 + m2,2 + m2,4. Recall, the lengths of the sifted
events when Alice measures in basis k and Bob measures in basis k′ are denoted by mk,k′ .
Our immediate goal now is to show that it is possible to extract a secret key of length ` > 0
from X1X2 if certain experimental conditions are met.
The starting point of our security analysis is to ask how many secret bits can be extracted
from Alice’ raw key X (of size n) given E+ (Eve’s total information about the overall joint
state shared between Alice and Bob, including the classical communication sent by Alice to
Bob). To this end, we use the quantum leftover-hash lemma [24] to determine the secret
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key length, `, giving
` = max
β∈(0,εsec/2]
⌊
H
εsec/2−β
min (X1X2|E+) + 4 log2 β − 2
⌋
, (17)
where the left-hand term in the floor function is the smooth min-entropy of X1X2 given E
+
(see Ref. [25] for more details). We can further break up the min-entropy term into two
parts by using a chain-rule inequality for smooth min-entropies,
H
εsec/2−β
min (X1X2|E+) ≥ H ε¯min(X1|X2E+) +H ε¯min(X2|E+) + log
(
1− (1− ε¯2)1/2) , (18)
where ε¯ = εsec/6 − β/3. To further simplify the analysis, we assume that X1 and X2 are
independent. In the experiment, this assumption can be achieved by having Alice prepare
highly entangled photon pairs (independent pairs), measure one half of each entangled pho-
ton pair, and send the other half to Bob via the quantum channel. This procedure in effect
produces random outcomes in each run, which implies X1 and X2 are independent variables.
With this, we have that
H
εsec/2−β
min (X1X2|E+) ≥ H ε¯min(X1|E+) +H ε¯min(X2|E+) + log
(
1− (1− ε¯2)1/2) , (19)
where now the smooth entropy terms H ε¯min(X1|E+) and H ε¯min(X2|E+) can be treated inde-
pendently. To translate these terms into expressions that can be bounded using experimental
data, we use a version of entropic uncertainty relations for two d = 4 mutually unbiased
bases to get
H ε¯min(X1|E+) ≥ 2n1 −H ε¯max(T1|T′1), (20)
H ε¯min(X2|E+) ≥ 2n2 −H ε¯max(T2|T′2), (21)
where T1 and T
′
1 are Alice’s and Bob’s measurement outcomes corresponding to basis 4,
and T2 and T
′
2 are the measurement outcomes corresponding to basis 3. Here, we suppose
that the measurements are acting locally on a four-dimensional Hilbert space, which is a
reasonable assumption since in practice Alice’ light source produces independent entangled
photon pairs. Assuming the error probabilities of Alice and Bob, within a basis, are uni-
formly distributed (i.e., they can be modelled by a depolarizing channel), then we have
that
H ε¯min(X1|E+) ≥ n1(2− h4(Q4D4,4 + ν(n1,m4,4, ε¯))), (22)
H ε¯min(X2|E+) ≥ n2(2− h4(Q4D3,3 + ν(n2,m3,3, ε¯))), (23)
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where Q4Dk,k′ is the observed error rate conditioned on Alice and Bob choosing basis k and k
′,
and
ν(n, k, ε) =
√
(n+ k)(k + 1) log(2/ε)
nk2
, (24)
is the statistical error due to finite sampling. Note that in the infinite key limit this term
goes to zero.
Now, putting everything together, we can establish a lower bound onH
εsec/2−β
min (X1X2|E+) ≥
next:
next ≡ n1(2− h4(Q4D4,4 + ν(n1,m4,4, ε¯))) + n2(2− h4(Q4D3,3 + ν(n2,m3,3, ε¯)))
− Synd4DEC − log2
2
εcor
, (25)
Synd4DEC =1.2n1h4(min[0.75, p
2Q4D1,1 + p
2Q4D1,2 + pqQ
4D
1,3 ])+
1.2n2h4(min[0.75, p
2Q4D2,1 + p
2Q4D2,2 + pqQ
4D
2,4 ]), (26)
where Synd4DEC and log2 2/εcor are the leakages due to error correction and verification, re-
spectively. Finally, we then get
`4D = max
β∈(0,εsec/4)
bnext + 4 log2 β − 2c . (27)
HEQKD Crosstalk Matrix and Eavesdropping Measurement
S.M. Fig. 6 shows the “crosstalk matrix” for all bases in the HEQKD protocol, demon-
strating that those bases can operate at low QBER in our system. In order to verify the
ability of HEQKD to detect an eavesdropper, we inserted in the channel to Bob a 9-mm
thick, a-cut calcite crystal oriented so that H and V polarizations are unaltered but travel
at different speeds. The calcite is thick enough so the H and V polarizations can no longer
interfere after exiting the calcite, because their wavepackets no longer overlap temporally.
The calcite introduces a ∼ 5-ps relative delay, much larger than ∼ 1.7-ps coherence time of
the 1.5-nm (0.4-nm) bandwidth 1550-nm (810-nm) photons. This simulates an eavesdropper
that measures only in basis 1 and simply records, then resends to Bob, what is measured.
With this technique, the eavesdropper gains a significant amount of information at the nec-
essary cost of introducing a significant amount of errors. S.M. Fig. 7 shows the expected and
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(a) (b)
FIG. 6: HEQKD Crosstalk Matrix For All Bases: (a) Ideal normalized crosstalk matrix.
Alice (Bob) is on the right (left) axis. (b) Measured normalized crosstalk matrix.
measured results of the eavesdropping. As expected, the results show a greatly increased
QBER in all bases involving measurements using superpositions of polarizations.
Polarization-Entangled BBM92
As alluded to elsewhere in this work, our system also has the capability to execute the
usual 2-state BBM92 protocol, in which Alice and Bob receive photons from a maximally
entangled pair source. In our case, the photons are entangled in their polarization, and the
state shared between Alice and Bob is
|ΨAB〉 = 1√
2
|t1t1〉 ⊗ (|HH〉+ |V V 〉). (28)
Alice and Bob, independently and randomly, measure in the two bases
{|H〉, |V 〉} and {|D〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉), |A〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉)}. (29)
The basis for measurement is randomly chosen by the 50/50 non-polarizing first beamsplitter
in Alice or Bob’s delay interferometer. If the photon goes through the short path, it is
analyzed in the H/V basis; if it travels the long path, it is analyzed in the D/A basis
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(a) (b)
FIG. 7: HEQKD Crosstalk Matrix For All Bases With Eavesdropper: (a) Ideal HEQKD
normalized crosstalk matrix when an eavesdropper performs an ideal intercept-resend
attack on basis 1. Alice (Bob) is on the right (left) axis. (b) Measured HEQKD normalized
crosstalk matrix with a 9-mm thick, a-cut calcite crystal which decoheres the polarization
in the H/V basis. QBER per basis for measured (ideal) system: QBER11 = 0.02(0.00),
QBER12 = 0.02(0.00), QBER13 = 0.01(0.00), QBER21 = 0.02(0.00),
QBER22 = 0.52(0.50), QBER24 = 0.49(0.50), QBER31 = 0.01(0.00),
QBER33 = 0.50(0.50), QBER34 = 0.50(0.50), QBER42 = 0.47(0.50),
QBER43 = 0.50(0.50), and QBER44 = 0.53(0.50).
because of a half waveplate (HWP) that effectively rotates the basis of that beamsplitter
port from H/V to D/A.
In addition to QBER, another useful metric is the shared information entropy, a.k.a.,
the mutual information per photon, which allows the user to know how many bits of key
are transferred per photon after sifting (removing trials where Alice and Bob measured in
different bases), in the asymptotic limit. The sifted shared entropy (SSE) is defined as:
S(A : B) ≡ S(A) + S(B)− S(A,B), (30)
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(a) (b)
FIG. 8: BBM92 Crosstalk Matrix: (a) Ideal BBM92 normalized crosstalk matrix. H/V
QBER = 0, D/A QBER = 0, and SSE = 1 bit. (b) Measured BBM92 normalized crosstalk
matrix. H/V QBER = 0.009, D/A QBER = 0.019, and SSE H/V (D/A) = 0.92 (0.87) bits.
where,
S(X) ≡ −
∑
i
pilog(pi) and S(X, Y ) ≡ −
∑
i,j
pi,jlog(pi,j). (31)
S.M. Fig. 8 shows the performance of our BBM92 setup. To test the ability of the
system to detect an eavesdropper, we inserted in the channel to Bob a 9-mm thick, a-cut
calcite crystal oriented so that H and V polarizations are unaltered but travel at different
speeds. The calcite is thick enough so the H and V polarizations can no longer interfere after
exiting the calcite, because their wavepackets no longer overlap temporally. This simulates
an eavesdropper that measures only in the H/V basis and simply records, then resends to
Bob, what is measured. With this technique, the eavesdropper gains a significant amount
of information at the necessary cost of introducing a significant amount of errors. Results
shown in S.M. Fig. 9 confirm that our system detects this increase in errors with the
calcite in place. The right side indeed shows an increase in errors as evidenced by the large
off-diagonal elements in the D/A basis sub-matrix.
Since there is a finite time window during orbit when we can establish the line-of-sight
quantum channel, it is important to characterize the system for various values of channel
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(a) (b)
FIG. 9: BBM92 Eavesdropping Crosstalk Matrix: (a)Ideal BBM92 normalized crosstalk
matrix when an eavesdropper measures the polarization qubit in the H/V basis. H/V
QBER = 0, D/A QBER = 0.5, and SSE H/V (D/A) = 1 (0) bits. (b) Measured BBM92
normalized crosstalk matrix with a calcite crystal which decoheres the polarization in the
H/V basis, simulating an eavesdropper performing a quantum measurement in the H/V
basis. H/V QBER = 0.028, D/A QBER = 0.48, and SSE H/V (D/A) = 0.83 (0.002) bits.
transmission. Also, errors from detector noise and background events become significant
when the channel transmission becomes too low. S.M. Fig. 10 shows the results of a
measurement where the QBER is recorded for each basis at decreasing values of channel
transmission. At the highest measured transmission in S.M. Fig. 10, our system (which was
not optimized for key rate but QBER) produced ∼2k sifted events/s. During those mea-
surements, Alice’s channel transmission was fixed at -15 dB, the pair production probability
was Pp = 0.025, and the laser repetition rate was 80 MHz. We conclude that, with our
current background and detector noise (which are comparable to what is expected in an ac-
tual implementation), the system can operate at reasonably low QBER (< 0.05) until about
-35 dB of channel transmission (corresponding to a transmission of 0.32%), neglecting finite
statistics. Using a finite key estimation technique, we see in S.M. Fig 12 that the minimum
allowed channel transmission is about -28 dB, in agreement with our rough estimate from
measurement above. Additionally, to quantify the errors associated with undesirable simul-
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FIG. 10: BBM92 QBER vs Transmission: Measurement of QBER for each BBM92 basis
while changing the transmission of the channel between the photon source and Bob.
During these measurements, Alice’s channel transmission was fixed at -12 dB.
taneous generation of multiple pairs from the entangled photon source, we measured the
QBER as a function of pair production probability, the probability that a pair is produced
in a given pump laser pulse; the results from that measurement are in S.M. Fig. 11. In S.M.
Fig. 12 we find, when accounting for finite statistics, the optimum Pp for an implementation
of this protocol from the ISS to Earth is Pp = 0.04.
State Generation and Detection
To generate entangled photons in time-bin and polarization, we use an 80-MHz mode-
locked, 532-nm laser, frequency doubled from 1064 nm, with a pulse width ∼7 ps (Spectra
Physics Vanguard 2.5W 355 laser). Each pulse of this beam is split into two time-bins
using a ∼2.4-ns delay (see Fig. 1). The beam is then used to pump a type-0 periodically-
poled lithium niobate crystal (poling period of 7.5 µm) that is within a polarizing Sagnac
interferometer. This Sagnac entangled photon source [26, 27], ignoring time bins, produces
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FIG. 11: BBM92 QBER vs Pair Production Probability: Measurement of QBER for each
BBM92 basis while changing the pair production probability.
the state (|H〉810|H〉1550 + eiφ|V 〉810|V 〉1550)√
2
. (32)
The 532-nm pump has a bandwidth of 64 GHz full-width at half-maximum (FWHM). The
peaks (bandwidths) of the downconversion photons are 809.7 nm (0.4 nm) and 1551 nm (1.5
nm). The downconversion bandwidths were measured using difference frequency generation
between the pump and a wavelength-tunable 1550-nm laser[28]; the laser wavelength was
swept while the counts on the 810-nm side were recorded[29].
The 1550-nm photons were detected using WSi superconducting nanowire detectors from
JPL, optimized for 1550 nm with an efficiency of ∼80%[30]. One detector had efficiency of
∼40% due to coupling fiber misalignment after installation, so 3-dB attenuators were added
to the fibers entering the other detectors to even out the detection efficiency. Avalanche
photodiodes (Excelitas SPCM-AQ4C) with efficiency ∼45% were used to detect the 810-nm
photons.
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FIG. 12: Finite Key BBM92 Simulation: Secure key length vs channel loss for various pair
production probabilities, calculated using the system parameters in Table 2 of the main
text.
Time-bin Phase Stabilization and Calibration
Due to natural environmental factors (vibration, temperature fluctuations), the phase
between the time bins is prone to drift; to counteract this we stabilized the phase using
an active proportional-integral (PI) feedback[31] system. The phase was measured using
some of the pump beam that was also sent (counter-propagating) through the analyzer
interferometer in a mode that was vertically displaced from the single-photon beam. The
output of the stabilization interferometer was measured using Detectors D1 and D2, low-
bandwidth amplified Si photodiodes (Thorlabs PDA36A). Due to the stabilization beam
wavelength not matching the design specification of some of the components, and because
the low-bandwidth detectors could not distinguish the interfering time bins (e.g., the short
(long) path in the pump interferometer and the long (short) path in Alice or Bob’s analyzer
interferometer) from the non-interfering ones (short paths in both interferometers and long
paths in both interferometers), the visibility was quite low (< 10%) and also different for D1
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and D2. This difference necessitated the use of a scaling factor γ to equalize the amplitude
of oscillation between D1 and D2. With this scaling factor, the Error signal, E, used for the
PI feedback algorithm was
E ≡ (ID1 − γID2)
(ID1 + γID2)
, with γ ∼ 0.6. (33)
The feedback system was designed to keep E at zero by sending a signal to a piezo-actuated
translation stage under the analyzer interferometer’s right-angle prism to adjust the phase,
at an update rate of 100 Hz. Independent PI systems were implemented for the Pump-Alice
combined interferometer and for the Pump-Bob combined interferometer.
Additionally, for QKD it is not only necessary that the phase is kept stable, but also that
it is calibrated to the correct value. By changing the phase between |H〉 and |V 〉, the liquid
crystals after Alice’s interferometer were used to adjust the phase of states in Basis 2 and
4 so that the photons were routed to the correct detector. For Basis 3 and Basis 4, it was
necessary to tilt (about the vertical axes) a QWP before the source to adjust the phase of
the polarization-entangled state so that |D〉 and |A〉 were routed to the correct detectors on
each side.
Time-bin Sorting Circuit Operation
As displayed in S.M. Fig. 13, there are three time bins which exit Alice or Bob’s time-
bin analyzer interferometer, each with a different exit time with respect to the pulse which
entered the pump delay interferometer. It is imperative to be able to distinguish all three
of these time bins for the HEQKD and BBM92 protocols implemented with this setup. The
measurement of time-bin qubits using free-running, single-photon detectors alone lacks the
ability to sort bases measurements when events from different time bins are routed to the
same detector as in this experiment. It was therefore necessary to develop a circuit which
could filter the events corresponding to different time bins into different electrical signals.
We used the pump laser as a clock reference and filtered the signals from each detector based
on their delay with respect to the laser clock, using an AND gate with a window width of
∼ 1 ns. Each time bin has a unique delay with respect to the laser clock so this enabled
complete filtering of the time bins.
In the time-bin sorting circuit, each detector output was copied (using ON Semi.
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FIG. 13: Franson Time-Bin Qubit Preparation and Measurement: This diagram illustrates
how the time bins are created and what possible combinations of them exit the second
delay interferometer. Here we assume that t2 − t1 = tp2 − tp1, i.e., that the path-length
imbalances are matched. In this case, photons in either of the middle two time bins can
interfere.
NB7VQ14M) three times and was ANDed with a copy of the clock that was delayed by the
correct amount so that only events from one of the time bins was successfully transmitted
through the AND gate. This process was executed for all eight detectors (four for Alice and
four for Bob) and for all three time bins, creating 24 unique output signals (12 for Alice and
12 for Bob).
To use an AND gate (Analog Devices HMC746LC3C) and adjustable delay chip (ON
Semi. MC100EP195B) with low jitter (< 100 ps) and high bandwidth (> 1 GHz), it
was necessary to transform the electrical signals from the detectors into signals compatible
with high-speed differential logic standards like CML and PECL. This was done using a
high-speed comparator (Maxim Int. MAX9602). Additionally, to achieve a subnanosecond
pulse so the AND gate had ∼ 1 ns acceptance window, the pulses from the detectors were
shortened to < 1 ns using a cascade of 2 high-speed D flip-flops (ON Semi. NBSG53A). A
pulse shortening effect was created by sending the comparator output into the CLK of the
D flip-flop with Q (input) attached to logic HIGH and using a delayed copy of the output
as a reset signal after the pulse was sent through the flip-flop. This long pulse was then sent
through another D flip-flop with a short reset signal, producing a much shorter pulse (∼ 1
ns) than the detector output pulses (∼ 40 ns). See S.M. Fig. 14 for a pictorial description.
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FIG. 14: Time-bin Sorting Circuit: Descriptive schematic of pulse shaping using the
MAX9602 high-speed comparator several NBSG53A high-speed D-flip flops with ∼ 50 ns
delay then a ∼ 700 ps delay.
Event Timetagging
The detection events of Alice and Bob were recorded using separate time-tagging elec-
tronic devices (UQDevices UQD-Logic-16, time-bin width 156 ps), synchronized via a com-
mon 10-MHz sine-wave clock (Agilent 33250A Function Generator). Also, one channel on
each time tagger was connected to a TTL pulse source (National Instruments DAQ USB-
6210) through cables of the same length. This allowed the different time offsets of each time
tagger to be measured accurately and subtracted out.
Doppler Shift
The Doppler shift discussed in this work is a non-negligible phase shift between two
closely spaced time bins, simply due to the fact that the source has moved significantly in
the ∼1-ns interval between the two time bins (S.M. Fig. 15b). There is also a frequency
shift on the photons but since
γ ≡ 1√
1− (VISS
c
)2
= 1.00000000033, (34)
which is quite close to 1 for VISS = 7.7 km/s, the frequency shift is negligible compared to
the photon bandwidth of ∼ 1 nm.
The exact phase shift produced through the Doppler effect is dependent on many pa-
rameters, including the maximum elevation angle of the orbit during a pass, which changes
for subsequent passes and is at a maximum for passes directly overhead. For time bins
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TABLE III: HEQKD Coincidence Matrix: Coincidence matrix of all detector and time bin
combinations used in the HEQKD protocol demonstration. See S.I. Fig. 13 for pictorial
definition of time bins tp1 + t1, (t
p
1 + t2 & t
p
2 + t1), and t
p
2 + t2. (a) Measurements when Alice
and Bob measure in bases 1 or 2. (b) Measurements when Alice measures in bases 3 or 4
and Bob measures in bases 1 or 2. (c) Measurements when Alice measures in bases 1 or 2
and Bob measures in bases 3 or 4. (d) Measurements when Alice and Bob measure in
bases 3 or 4.
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TABLE IV: BBM92 Coincidence Matrix: Coincidence matrix of all detector and time-bin
combinations used in the BBM92 protocol demonstration. See S.I. Fig. 13 for pictorial
definition of time bins tp1 + t1, (t
p
1 + t2 & t
p
2 + t1), and t
p
2 + t2, where
(tp1 + t2 & t
p
2 + t1)=t
p
2(1) + t1(2).
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(a) (b)
FIG. 15: Expected Doppler Shift: (a) Expected Doppler shift for overhead orbit of the
International Space Station. (b) Pictorial explanation of effect of Doppler shift on time
bins.
separated by 1.5 ns, calculations using a simulation of the ISS orbit (with orbit inclination
of 51◦, 400 km altitude and with longitudinal velocity calculated along the beam path to
ground station at 39◦ latitude) and the relativistic longitudinal Doppler shift equation [32]
show, for a representative 85◦ maximum elevation angle orbit of the International Space
Station, an expected shift of
∆L(t) =
(√√√√1 + VISS(t)c
1− VISS(t)
c
− 1
)
(10−9s)c, (35)
as displayed in Fig. 15. If acquisition starts and stops at a 20◦ elevation angle then the total
∆L from tstart to tstop is ∆L(tstop)−∆L(tstart) = 20µm.
We implement an in-lab simulation of this Doppler shift, during our compensation system
testing, by moving a piezo-actuated translation stage which controls the position of the
pump’s right-angle prism with the same distance vs time profile as in S.M. Fig. 15a.
